International Law Studies - Volume 75
International Law Across the Spectrum of Conflict
Essays in Honour of Professor L.C. Green On the Occasion of His Eightieth Birthday
Michael N. Schmitt (Editor)

xv
Antecedents of the Rome Statute of the
International Criminal Court Revisited

Shabtai Rosenne

O

N JULY 17, 1998 the United Nations Conference of Plenipotentiaries
on the Establishment of an International Criminal Court adopted the
Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court .{hereafter Rome Statute or
Statute).l This was the culmination of the hopes and dreams of many genera,
tions of international lawyers and others who aimed at seeing international
law placed on a sounder basis than the voluntarist conceptions so character,
istic of it.
One hundred and sixty States took part in the Conference, held in Rome be,
tween June 15 and July 17, 1998. Thirty,one official organizations and other
entities were represented at the Conference by observers. In addition, observ,
ers from 134 non,governmental organizations participated. The Rome Statute
was adopted on a non,recorded vote of 120 in favor, seven against, and 21 ab,
stentions, the remaining States not taking part in the vote. The purpose of this
article is to retrace briefly the developments that led to the Rome Statute, to'
gether with some afterthoughts.
It is a pleasure to dedicate this article to my friend of about fifty years standing, Leslie
Green. The author wishes to acknowledge the assistance of Hans,Peter Gasser,
Editor,in.Chief of the International Review of the Red Cross, in preparing this article.

The opinions shared in this paper are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views and opinions
of the U.S. Naval War College, the Dept. of the Navy, or Dept. of Defense.

Antecedents of the Rome Statute of the ICC Revisited

In the Beginning (1872-1914)
It is common knowledge that in the Middle Ages knights could be "tried" by
their peers of another people or another fiefdom for violation of the accepted
canons of knightly behavior or for allowing particularly vicious acts to be per'
formed by soldiers under their authority. A well, known example of this is the
so-called Breisach trial of 1447. Z These, however, were hardly war crimes trials
as we understand them today. Rather they were knightly courts of honor decid,
ing on violations, direct or indirect, of knightly codes.
Another attempt at quasi, criminal international proceedings encountered
during the mid,nineteenth century should be noted. As part of its campaign
against the slave trade, Great Britain concluded a series of bilateral agree'
ments. These allowed duly commissioned ships of the Royal Navy to visit and
search on the high seas flag vessels of the other State, and bring vessels sus'
peeted of engaging in illegal slave trade operations into port. Here they would
be brought before a mixed commission for adjudication. The mb:ed commis,
sion would decide, without appeal, whether or not a vessel brought before it
was a slave ship trading illicitly and legally captured, and would accordingly ei,
ther condemn it as lawful prize and liberate the slaves it carried, or acquit it and
restore both the vessels and the slaves to their owners. These mixed commis,
sions had no jurisdiction over the owners, masters or crews of the condemned
vessels. Individuals were to be handed over to their own authorities for trial and
punishment in their own courts and according to their own laws. MLxed com,
missions of this kind sat to the east along the coast from the Cape of Good
Hope to the Cape Verde Islands, and in the west from Rio de Janeiro to New
York, with the court at Freetown, Sierra Leone, being the most important. It is
estimated that over 600 slave vessels were condemned by these commissions
and that some 80,000 slaves were liberated by them. They functioned between
1819 and 1871)
Credit for the first attempt in modem times to develop a system of an inter,
national criminal tribunal goes to Gustave Moynier of Switzerland. Moynier,
together with Henry Dunant, was one of the founders of the International Red
Cross, through the Geneva Red Cross Conference of 1863,4 followed by the
first Geneva Conference of 1864. That Conference adopted the Convention
for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded in Armies in the Field
of 22 August 1864.5 Dismayed at the failure of the belligerents in the
Franco,Prussian War of 1870-1871 to observe faithfully the provisions of the
Geneva Convention in its first real test, Moynier conceived the idea of an es,
tablished standing international machinery to make it possible to try
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individuals who allegedly violated the provisions of the Convention.6 He was
able to persuade his colleagues of what became known as the International
Committee of the Red Cross to circulate his proposal to the national committees, for consideration at a future Red Cross Conference'?
The gist of Moynier's proposal was that as soon as war had been declared,
the President of the Swiss Confederation was to choose by lot three Powers
party to the Geneva Convention, excluding belligerents. The three governments, together with those of the belligerents, were to be invited to nominate
an "adjudicator" [arbitre]. Those five persons would constitute a tribunal. That
tribunal, however, would deal only with breaches of the Convention that had
been the subject of complaints addressed to it by interested governments. The
tribunal was to subject the facts to an adversarial inquiry and then present its
decision, for each individual case, as a verdict of guilty or not guilty. If guilt was
established, the tribunal was to pronounce a penalty, in accordance with provisions ofinternationallaw. The latter were to be the "subject of a treaty which is
complementary" to the proposed convention on the international judicial
body. The tribunal was to notify its judgments to interested governments.
These, for their part, were to impose on those found guilty the penalties that
had been pronounced against them. Another interesting provision was to the
effect that where a complaint was accompanied by a request for damages and
interest, the tribunal would be competent to rule on that claim and to fix the
amount of the compensation. "The government of the offender will be responsible for implementing the decision." In this scheme, what was permanent was
not the tribunal itself but the mechanism for the establishment of a tribunal in
time of war.
This proposal did not receive a warm welcome. A longish note by Moynier's
friend and colleague, the Belgian jurist G. Rolin-Jaequemyns, gives the text
of replies received from several eminent internationalists of that epoch.
These included F. Lieber of the United States of America,8 A. Morin of France,
F. de Holtzendorff of Germany, John Westlake of Great Britain, and the
Asamblea espanola de la Asociacion internacional para el secorso de los
heridos en campana of Madrid-apparently the only national society to reply
to the circular.9
Moynier's proposal attacked several of the centrai problems that the idea of
a permanent international criminal court raises. Among these are the selection
of the judges, the law to be applied, jurisdiction both ratione personae and
ratione materiae and its scope ratione temporis, the enforcement of the decision,
and the relation between the criminal responsibility of an individual even
though the agent of the State and the international responsibility of the State
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itself (an aspect now regulated by Article 3 of the Hague Convention No. IV of
1907 with respect to the laws and customs of war on land).10 The proposal
bears traces showing that it could have been inspired by a combination of fac~
tors. These include the general attack on international law as "law" without
regular enforcement machinery through standing courts; the influence of the
Alabama arbitration taking place in Moynier's hometown and the seat of the
Red Cross, Geneva; dismay in Red Cross circles at the relative weakness of the
Geneva Convention brought out during the Franco~Prussian war; and perhaps
to some extent the experience of the Central Commission of the Rhine that
was exercising some civil and criminal jurisdiction, even if of limited and local~
ized scope.
However, the proposal was ahead of its time. No international experience
had been acquired of any permanent international judicial instance of univer~
sal competence. The absence of an agreed international code on the law of war
and on the conduct of warfare, and setting forth what acts, when committed by
an individual, could be considered criminal, detracted from the feasibility of
any kind of international criminal tribunal at that period. Furthermore, the
concept of extradition formalized in national legislation and in international
treaties was relatively undeveloped and there was-and still is-well~marked
reticence on the part of many influential States to allow the extradition of their
nationals, save perhaps in the most exceptional circumstances. The existence
of factors such as these was not propitious for the fundamental innovation in
international law and practice that the creation of an international judicial in~
stance exercising jurisdiction over an individual acting as agent of the State
would entail, even on so limited a scale as Moynier envisaged.
In this connection, it is interesting to observe that after the failure of
Moynier's initiative in 1872, the International Committee of the Red Cross did
not return to the idea of establishing an international criminal court to try indi~
viduals accused of violations of the Geneva Conventions. Instead, it focused its
attention more on securing national legislation criminalizing individuals for
such violations. The issue of an international penal jurisdiction does not seem
to have been bised in the Geneva Red Cross Conferences of 1929, 1949, and
1974-1977. The most that occurred was in connection with the 1949 confer~
ence, where the International Committee suggested including in all the Con~
ventions to be adopted at that Conference a provision regarding grave
breaches. According to that suggestion, grave breaches were to be punished as
crimes against the law of nations by the tribunals of any of the parties to the
Convention "or by any international jurisdiction." This proposal, however, was
not pursued)!
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Nevertheless, Moynier's initiative was not without practical consequences.
His reference to international law that was to be made was followed by a rapid
spurt in the development of the jus in bello, the law governing the conduct of
warfare. That was prompted, of course, by a combination of many diverse at~
tributes. These included, alongside the intellectual and humanitarian activism,
rapid technological advances in that period, both generally and in the weapons
of war. This development ran on two~parallel and interactive lines. One was a
series of intergovernmental treaty~making conferences-at Brussels (1874),
The Hague (1899, 1907) and London (1908-1909). The second was activity de
lege ferenda on a grand scale by the Institute of International Law (of which
Moynier was one of the founders), leading to a series of resolutions on different
aspects. The most important was the Oxford Manual on the laws of war on land
of 1880 and a parallel manual on the laws of naval war governing the relations
between belligerents, also adopted at Oxford (1913).1 2 Many prominent inter~
national lawyers and diplomats were active on both those tracks. At the same
time, individual scholars were beginning to look into the question. 13
The law embodied in the Geneva Conventions, from 1864 up to and includ~
ing the Additional Protocols of 1977, used to be termed "Geneva law," and the
succession of treaties, declarations, and other instruments governing the con~
duct of warfare was designated as "Hague law." Geneva law was concerned
with individuals-victims of war (military and civilian) and the perpetrators of
violations of the laws and customs established for their protection, whether
military or civilian personnel. Hague law dealt with the rights and duties of
States in their conduct of warfare. Breach of the applicable treaties could lead
to a case of State responsibility. The black~letter texts were at this stage
couched in the language of rights and duties of States as the subjects ofinterna~
tionallaw. They paid little attention to the actions of individuals, whether in a
position of command and authority, or subordinates. They show little signs of
recognition of the importance and relevance of military hierarchy. Both sets of
treaties and the law that they enunciate have become heavily encrusted with
rules and practices of customary international law generated by the black~letter
texts. These largely place responsibility for the application of the rules oflaw on
individuals (especially members of the armed forces) as the instrumentalities
through which States act or even when an individual is acting sua sponte and
not under orders.
In addition, the development of the concept of human rights on a universal
scale embodied in the Charter of the UN and amplified in the Universal Decla~
ration of Human Rights and other instruments has had a direct impact on this
branch of the law. One consequence has been that the distinction between
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Geneva law and Hague law has become increasingly artificial, especially when
the law envisages individual criminal responsibility for violations. The two
branches of the law are now plaited together as international humanitarian
law, which nonetheless maintains the distinction between the international re~
sponsibility of the State and the criminal responsibility of an individual. It is not
clear when the term "international humanitarian law" was first used. The In~
ternational Court ofJustice has endorsed it.1 4 Established competence "in rele~
vant areas of international law such as international humanitarian law" is one
of the qualifications required for judges of the new Court by Article 36, para~
graph 3 (b) (ii), of the Rome Statute.
Intermezzo: The Peace Treaties and the League of Nations (1919-1939)
A major step forward was taken in the Treaty of Versailles of 1919. 15 Article
227 envisaged the trial of the Kaiser Wilhelm II by a special tribunal "for a su~
preme offence against international morality and the sanctity of treaties." The
special tribunal was to be composed of five judges, one appointed by each of the
Principal Allied and Associated Powers, and to be guided by the highest mo~
tives of international policy, with a view to vindicating the solemn obligations
of international undertakings and the validity of international morality. It was
to fix the punishment which it thought should be imposed. The Allied and As~
socia ted Powers "will address a request to the Government of the Netherlands
[to which the Kaiser had fled on his abdication as Emperor of Germany] for the
surrender [not "extradition"] to them of the ex~Emperor in order that he may
be put on trial." As is well known, the Dutch Government refused to "surren~
der" the Kaiser, and the matter of his trial was quietly dropped. The signifi~
cance of this provision is its recognition-probably the first instance in modern
times-that the Head of State can be criminally liable for violations of interna~
tionallaw, not limited to international humanitarian law or what we would to~
day call "war crimes."16 In addition, Article 228 provided that the Allied and
Associated Powers could bring before military tribunals persons accused of
having committed acts in violation of the laws and customs of war. Article 229
provided for the trial of persons guilty of criminal acts against the nationals of
one of the Allied and Associated Powers before the military tribunals of that
power. All those provisions, however, came up against the obstacle that Ger~
man law did not permit the extradition of German nationals, and apparently
viewed "surrender" as another word for "extradition." Some Germans accused
of war crimes were tried by German Courts. However, on the \,:hole, in practice
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those provisions of the Treaty of Versailles were not satisfactory.17 Their im~
portance is more conceptual.
Thus, the modem process had begun.
The next step was taken a year later, in 1920. The Committee ofJurists ap~
pointed under Article 14 of the Covenant of the League of Nations to prepare
the statute of the Permanent Court of International Justice adopted a resolu~
tion for the establishment of a High Court ofInternational Justice, to try crimes
constituting a breach of international public order or against the universal law
of nations referred to it by the League Assembly or Council. This Court would
have the power to define the nature of the crime, fix the penalty, and decide
the appropriate means of carrying out the sentence. The resolution came be~
fore the first session of the League Assembly (1920) which, however, did not
adopt it, and the matter was accordingly dropped. I8
At this point, nongovernmental organizations began to show interest in the
matter. Drafts were prepared by the Inter~Parliamentary Union, the Interna~
tional Law Association, the International Congress of Penal Law and the Inter~
national Association of Penal Law (this latter adopting a proposal by V.V. Pella,
who was to play an important role after the Second World War).I 9 At that stage
there was a widespread feeling-not shared in political circles-that in one way
or another appropriate competence should be conferred on the Permanent
Court ofInternationalJustice, then a new and untried international institution.
On the diplomatic front, the Special International Conference on Repres~
sion of Terrorism was in session from 1 to 16 November 1937. It adopted a
Convention for the Prevention and Punishment of Terrorism and a Conven~
tion for the Creation of an International Criminal Court, neither of which,
however, entered into force. 2o That Court's jurisdiction was limited to the of~
fenses set out in the Convention for the Prevention and Punishment ofTerror~
ism. The judges were to be nominated by States parties, and chosen by the
Permanent Court of International Justice. The Convention was quite detailed,
with 56 articles in all (including the final clauses). Considering the general de~
terioration of the international situation by 1937, it is quite remarkable that
this Conference, attended by 31 States-including the Soviet Union, but not
Germany, Italy or Japan--could reach agreement on such complex texts,
something that really was to elude the United Nations until 1998.
Restart in the United Nations (1945-1967)
The Declaration on the Defeat of Germany and the Assumption of Supreme
AuthOrity with Respect to Germany, signed at Berlin on June 5, 1945, was the
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next major advance. 21 Article 11 of that instrument required the German au~
thorities to apprehend and surrender to the Allies all persons from time to time
named or designated by rank, office or employment by the Allies as having
been suspected of having committed, ordered or abetted war crimes or analo~
gous offenses. This was followed by the Agreement for the Prosecution and
Punishment of Major War Criminals of the European Axis, signed at London
on August 8, 1945.22 The precedent of the Treaty of Versailles was not being
followed, and the prohibition of German law on the extradition or surrender of
German nationals leading to their trial in a foreign court was made inoperative.
The unconditional surrender of Germany made this possible.
It is unnecessary here to go over the story of the London Agreement and the
Charter of the International Military Tribunal for the Far East, Tokyo, January
19, 1946,23 and of the N iirnberg and Tokyo Tribunals. They set in motion pow~
erful trends for the establishment of a permanent international criminal tribu~
nal to avoid the creation of ad hoc tribunals in the future. The first major move
in that direction accompanied the drafting of the Convention on the Preven~
tion and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide of December 9, 1948.24 Article
VI of that Convention provides:
Persons charged with genocide or any of the other acts enumerated in article III
[conspiracy, incitement, attempt or complicity regarding genocide] shall be tried
by a competent tribunal in the State in the territory of which the act was
committed, or by such international penal tribunal as may have jurisdiction with
respect to those Contracting Parties which shall have accepted its jurisdiction.25

When the General Assembly adopted that Convention and opened it for
signature, it also adopted Resolution 230 (II) B. Here it invited the newly
formed International Law Commission to study the desirability and possibility
of establishing an international judicial organ for the trial of persons charged
with genocide or other crimes over which jurisdiction will be conferred upon
that organ by other internati~mal agreements. It requested the International
Law Commission to pay attention to the possibility of establishing a Criminal
Chamber of the International Court of Justice. That resolution must be
regarded as the starting point of the process that led to the Rome Statute of
1998. Its point of departure was the work accomplished during the period of the
League of Nations and the 1945 activities of the victorious Allies, but future
developments were unrestricted. 26
At its first session in 1949, the International Law Commission held a prelim~
inary discussion. It rejected proposals to postpone the matter to the following
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session and decided to appoint a rapporteur to report to that next session. At its
33rd meeting it appointed two rapporteurs, R.J. Alfaro (Panama) and Judge
A.E.F. Sandstrom (Sweden), to prepare working papers on the topicP The
two working papers were duly presented. Each examined the two aspects men,
tioned specifically in the General Assembly's resolution, namely the general
question, and the particular aspect of the employing of the International Court
of Justice for this purpose.
Alfar028 dealt mainly with the evolution of the idea of an international crim,
inal jurisdiction, without adding much to the Secretariat's Historical Survey.
He was unhesitatingly of the opinion that instituting an international criminal
jurisdiction was both desirable and feasible "for the prevention and punish,
ment of international crimes."
If the rule of law is to govern the community of States and protect it against the
violations of the International public order, it can only be satisfactorily established
by the promulgation of an international penal code and by the permanent
functioning of an international criminal jurisdiction (para. 136).
Regarding the International Court of Justice, he pointed out that an
amendment to Artiele 34 of the Statute would be required to establish a
chamber of the Court with power to try States and individuals. With that
proviso, he would answer the question in the affirmative (para. 134).
Sandstrom29 concentrated more on the possibility of establishing an inter,
national criminal judicial organ, carefully weighing the pros and cons. His con,
elusions were negative:
39. In my opinion the cons outweigh by far the pros. A permanent judicial
criminal organ established in the actual organization of the international
community would be impaired by very serious defects and would do more
harm than good. The time cannot as yet be considered ripe for the
establishment of such an organ.

40. If such a judicial organ is to be established, it is submitted that, in view of the
defects with which it would be impaired, it would be preferable to provide for
the possibility of establishing a Criminal Chamber of the International Court
of Justice in case of need. The defects would then be less noticeable, and
such a possibility could perhaps in a given case meet the criticism voiced
against the Niirnberg trial.
The Commission dealt with the matter at its 41st to 44th meetings during its
second session (1950). After votes, the Commission decided that the
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establishment of an international judicial organ for the trial of persons charged
with genocide or other crimes over which jurisdiction will be conferred upon it
by international convention was desirable. It went on to decide that the establishment of such an international judicial organ was possible. Finally, it reported
that it had paid attention to the possibility of establishing a criminal chamber of
the International Court of] ustice and that, though it was possible to do so by
amendment of the Court's Statute, the Commission did not recommend it.3o
The General Assembly discussed this at its fifth session in 1950. The Cold
War was dominating all activities in the United Nations then, not a promising
moment for dispassionate consideration of so delicate a matter as the establishment of an international criminal court. In Resolution 489 (V), December 12,
1950, the General Assembly showed that a final decision regarding the setting up
of an international penal tribunal could not be taken except on the basis of concrete proposals. It accordingly established a Committee composed of 17 Member
States "to prepare one or more preliminary draft conventions and proposals relating to the establishment and the statute of an international criminal court. "31
The Committee was in session from August 1 to 31, 1951.32 It produced a
draft statute for an international criminal court in 55 articles (excluding the
preamble and the final clauses). It also adopted a vreu in which, referring to the
Genocide Convention, it expressed the wish that along with the instrument establishing the International Criminal Court, a provision should be drawn up
conferring jurisdiction on that Court in respect of the crime of genocide. The
report is important. It set out the first general outline of the structure of the
proposed tribunal. The draft statute was divided into several chapters, on general principles (Articles 1-3), the organization of the Court (Articles 4-24),
the competence of the Court (Articles 25-32), the committing authOrity and
prosecuting authority, not an organ of the court, the Committee drawing the
attention of the General Assembly to the need to establish special investigatory
and prosecuting machinery (Articles 33-34), procedure (Articles 35-53),
clemency (Article 54) and final provisions (Article 55). That has remained the
basic structure for the international criminal court. Among the deficiencies of
the draft was Article 2, on the law to be applied, except that the Rome Statute
has included the prosecution among the organs of the new Court, a curious
abandonment of any idea of the separation of powers. It was pari:ly similar to
Moynier's 1872 suggestion, and partly reflected the ICRe's change of direction, aiming at incorporating the relevant provisions in national criminal law:
"The Court shall apply international law, including international criminal law,
and where appropriate, national law." There were other deficiencies. The draft
was subjected to a series of critical written observations by several
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governments, including some that had been represented on the Committee,
and even more serious criticism in the Sixth Committee's debate that year.33
The General Assembly then adopted Resolution 687 (VII), December 5,
1952.34 Here it decided to appoint another committee of 17 Member States to
be designated by the President of the General Assembly (Lester Pearson of
Canada). Its mandate was more complicated. The new Committee was, in the
light of the 'comments and suggestions of governments, (i) to explore the impli~
cations and consequences of establishing an international criminal court and of
the various methods by which this might be done; (ii) to study the relationship
between such a court and the United Nations and its organs; and (iii) to reex~
amine the draft statute. This resolution brought out the more general complex~
ities of the subject, something that before had not been clear.
The 1953 Committee was in session between July 27 and August 20, 1953.
In its report, it in effect followed what the earlier Committee had reported, sug~
gesting only some minor changes in the Statute as previously drafted. On the
central issue of the law to be applied, Article 2 merely repeated unchanged Ar~
ticle 2 of the earlier draft.3 5 In Resolution 898 (IX), December 4, 1954, the
General Assembly did not really accept this. It noted the connection between
the question of defining aggression, the draft Code of Offenses against the
Peace and Security of Mankind, and the question of an international criminal
jurisdiction. It decided to postpone consideration of the international criminal
court until the General Assembly had taken up again the questions of the defi~
nition of aggression and the draft Code of Offenses. This well brings out that at
that time the question of the applicable law continued to be the central issue of
interest on the political level. Simultaneously, in Resolution 895 (IX) of the
same date, the General Assembly established a new special committee to sub~
mit in 1956 a detailed report with a draft definition of aggression. At the same
time the International Law Commission submitted a report on the draft Code of
Offenses Against the Peace and Security of Mankind.36 In Resolution 897 (IX),
also of December 4, 1954, the General Assembly, referring to its decision regard~
ing the definition of aggression, decided to postpone further consideration of the
Code until the Committee on the definition of aggression had submitted its re~
port. The three items in that way became bound together, a triad. The decision
to postpone these items sine die was a direct consequence of the Cold War.
The Special Committee on the Definition of Aggression submitted its report
in 1956.37 Meanwhile, the early crisis of the United Nations on the admission
of new members had been resolved and the beginnings of the decolonization
process were taking place. Those two processes produced profound changes in
the composition and institutional character of the United Nations, especially
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the General Assembly. In Resolution 1181 (XII), November 29, 1957, the
General Assembly noted that 22 additional States had recently joined the
United Nations. It requested the Secretary,General to take the view of the new
Member States and to place the question of defining aggression on the provi,
sional agenda of the General Assembly not earlier than its 14th session (1959),
after another special committee had advised him that it considered the time
appropriate. That resolution was adopted on a roll, call vote, something rare on
draft resolutions coming from the Sixth Committee, of 42:24: 15 with one State
absent. The negative votes were cast by the Soviet Bloc together with some
Latin American, Arab, and other States, and the abstentions were similarly
scattered. That vote shows the impact of the Cold War and the changing com,
position of the General Assembly on what was nothing more than a procedural
decision, in effect deferring consideration of the matter for another two years at
least. However, no recommendation to renew discussion of the definition of
aggression was ever made.
Meanwhile, as the Cold War continued, the decolonization process pro'
duced an enormous increase in the membership of the United Nations, com,
pletely changing all voting patterns in the General Assembly and in diplomatic
conferences and enhancing the role of "consensus" in decision making as op,
posed to a majority vote. On top of that, the Six Days War (1967) led to a rna,
jor international crisis. That was to generate a new phase in the development of
each of these three interlocked items. To widespread surprise, the Soviet Un,
ion took the initiative. Before the exercise was completed, the Soviet Union,
and with it the Soviet Bloc in the United Nations, had also collapsed, leading
to further profound changes in the composition and character of the United
Nations overall, and the General Assembly in particular.
This first United Nations phase had brought out two aspects in particular:
(i) the close connection that exists between the establishment of an Interna,
tional Criminal Court and the law to be applied, quite apart from any question
arising out of the Genocide Convention; and (ii) the question of the relation,
ship to exist between the criminal court and the United Nations, and in par tic,
ular the Security Council. It also showed that on the political level the question
of the law to be applied contained at least two separate elements, namely the
definition of aggression and the code of offenses against the peace and security
of mankind, that item itself being more directly the offshoot of the Nurnberg
Judgment. Further developments regarding the court would therefore depend
on the progress in those two other matters.
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The Definition of Aggression, the Code of Crimes
and the Geneva Red Cross Conference (1967-1991)
On September 22, 1967, the USSR requested the inclusion in the agenda of
the 22nd session of the General Assembly of a tendentiously worded additional
item entitled: "Need to expedite the drafting of a definition of aggression in the
light of the present international situation." The item was taken on the agenda
after a bitter procedural debate. In an unusual procedure it was allocated to
plenary meetings for a general debate, and then, in light of that debate and the
results achieved, to the Sixth Committee. The General Assembly decided in
Resolution 2330 (XXII), December 18, 1967, to establish a Special Committee
on the Question of Defining Aggression to consider all aspects of the question
and to report back to the General Assembly. Retracing the subsequent devel,
opments is not necessary here. It is sufficient to say that in Resolution 3314
(XXIX), December 14,1974, the General Assembly, without a vote, adopted a
definition of aggression.3 8 That definition does not, however, deal with "the
crime of aggression" as a matter of the criminal responsibility of an individual.
Article 5 of the Rome Statute includes "the crime of aggression" among the
crimes over which the new International Criminal Court will have jurisdiction.
As it is, it does not explain what that means for individual criminal responsibil,
ity. In Resolution F annexed to its Final Act, the Conference requested the
Preparatory Commission established by that resolution inter alia to prepare pro,
posals for a provision on aggression for submission to the Assembly of States
Parties at a Review Conference.3 9 Although the Niirnberg and Tokyo Tribu,
nals had little difficulty in dealing with charges of crimes against peace by the
planning, preparation, initiation, and waging of wars of aggression against the
accused before them-all senior officers of the State-the problem today is
complicated because of the existence of the Security Council with primary re,
sponsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security. The issue
to be faced is whether the International Criminal Court can have jurisdiction
over a case of aggression regardless of whether the Security Council has for,
mally determined that an act of aggression has taken place (Charter, Article
39).
In 1968 the Special Committee on the Definition of Aggression drew the
General Assembly's attention to the question of the Draft Code of Offenses
against the Peace and Security of Mankind, but no action was taken then.
When the General Assembly adopted the definition of aggression, it again took
note of observations by the Secretary,General regarding the Draft Code and
the international criminal court, without adopting then any ope~ative
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decision. 40 In 1977 the International Law Commission raised the question of
renewing consideration of the Draft Code. In Resolution 33/97, December 16,
1978, the General Assembly requested the Secretary~General to ascertain
views of Member States and relevant intergovernmental organizations, a re~
quest that was reiterated in Resolution 35/97, December 4, 1980. In Resolution
36/106, December 10, 1981, the General Assembly invited the International
Law Commission to resume its work on that topic. The International Law
Commission recommenced its work in 1982. In 1996 it adopted what is now
named the Draft Code of Crimes against the Peace and Security of Mankind,
and submitted it to the General Assembly.41
In Resolution 44/39, December 4, 1989, dealing with trafficking in narcotics
across national frontiers, the General Assembly invited the International Law
Commission, when considering the Draft Code, to address the question of es~
tablishing an international criminal court or other international criminal trial
mechanism with jurisdiction over persons alleged to have committed crimes
that may be covered under such a code, including persons engaged in illicit
trafficking in narcotic drugs across national frontiers. This showed that politi~
cal thinking was beginning to envisage a wider role for the proposed interna~
tional criminal jurisdiction than for the Genocide or Apartheid Conventions or
to enforce the law applicable in times of armed conflict. In 1992 the Commis~
sion included a detailed survey of the question in its examination of the Draft
Code.42
One other major event of this period, formally outside the United Nations,
was the Diplomatic Conference on the Reaffirmation and Development of In~
ternational Humanitarian Law Applicable in Armed Conflicts. That Confer~
ence, in session from 1974 to 1977, was, as is traditional for the Geneva
Conventions, convened and organized by the Swiss Government to examine
and adopt texts based on 'preparatory work undertaken by the International
Committee of the Red Cross. That Conference completed its work with the
adoption of two instruments, formally entitled Protocols Additional to the
Geneva Conventions of 12 August, 1949. One related to the Protection ofVic~
tims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I) and the second to the Pro~
tection of Victims ofNon~international Armed Conflicts (Protocol II). Those
two instruments are important additions to and updates of the 1949 Geneva
Conventions. They include very carefully drafted and reasonably comprehen~
sive listings of what those instruments classify as breaches or grave breaches, al~
though some of them are controversial and not universally accepted. Together
with the Geneva Conventions of 1949 on the protection of war victims, they
completed the process of establishing the rules of international humanitarian
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law as a self~standing branch of the law, not dependent on the existence of a
formal state of war. In that way they bring the Geneva law into line with the
fundamental rule of Article 2, paragraph 4, of the UN Charter, prohibiting the
use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any
State or in any manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations. It
is to be noted that the detailing of war crimes in Article 8 of the Rome Statute
does not always follow exactly the language of the Geneva Conventions and
the Additional Protocols as regards breaches and grave beaches. This is a possi~
ble cause of difficulty for the new court. The Rome Conference may have ex~
ceeded its formal mandate when it made those changes.43
To Rome (1992-1998)
In Resolution 47/33, November 25, 1992, the General Assembly requested
the Secretary~General to seek written comments of States on that section of
the report of the International Law Commission in which the Commission, as
requested, addressed the issue of the proposed criminal court. At the same
time, in a marked change from its attitude in the 1950s, it invited the Commis~
sion to continue its work on the question by undertaking to prepare a draft stat~
ute for the proposed court as a matter of priority. Accordingly, in 1993 the
Commission reconvened the Working Group, which prepared what it termed a
preliminary version of the draft statute for an international criminal tribunal
and commentaries thereto. 44 In Resolution 48/31, December 4, 1993, the Gen~
eral Assembly requested the Commission to continue its work as a matter of
priority, and if possible to submit a draft statute in 1994. This the Commission
did. It reestablished a new Working Group and went on to draw up a complete
Statute in 60 articles with commentaries, together with an Annex and three
Appendices. The Commission recommended to the General Assembly to con~
vene an international conference of plenipotentiaries to study the draft statute
and to conclude a convention on the establishment of an international crimi~
nal court.45
In that condition the question reve~ted to the political organs for the final
decisions to be taken. The discussion in the General Assembly soon showed
that the International Law Commission's draft was not widely accepted and
could not, as it stood, form the basic text for an international plenipotentiary
conference. Accordingly, the first step of the General Assembly was to estab~
lish an Ad hoc Committee open to all States members of the United Nations or
of specialized agencies. In Resolution 49/53, December 9, 1994, the General
Assembly set out the function of this new Committee requiring it to review the
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major substantive and administrative issues arising out of the draft prepared by
the International Law Commission. The report of that Ad hoc Committee came
before the next session of the General Assembly.46 In Resolution 50/46, De~
cember 11, 1995, the General Assembly decided to establish a Preparatory
Committee to continue preparing a widely acceptable consolidated text of a
convention on an international criminal court as a next step towards consider~
ation by a conference of plenipotentiaries. It also decided to include the item in
the provisional agenda of the 52nd session in order to study the report of the
Preparatory Committee "and, in the light of that report, to decide on the con~
vening of a conference of plenipotentiaries to finalize and adopt a convention
on the establishment of an international criminal court, including on the tim~
ing and duration of the Conference." Composition of the Committee was
slightly adjusted and included States members of the International Atomic En~
ergy Agency, a technical modification. Some 90 States took part in the work of
the Preparatory Committee at one stage or another. Comprising approximately
one~half of the total membership of the organized international community,
the Preparatory Committee was broadly representative of all trends that had to
be taken into consideration.
That Preparatory Committee was in session throughout 1996 and 1997. It
reported to the 51st session of the General Assembly. In Resolution 51/207,
December 17, 1996, the General Assembly noted that major substantive and
administrative issues remained to be resolved. These included, apart from the
definition of different crimes, such issues as the relationship between the inter~
national court and national jurisdictions (the problem of complementarity),
the so~called trigger mechanism, and the relationship of the court to the
United Nations, to mention but a few. At the same time it noted that despite
this, the Preparatory Committee considered that it was realistic to regard the
holding of a diplomatic conference of plenipotentiaries in 1998 as feasible. The
General Assembly accordingly decided that the Preparatory Committee should
continue its work, that the diplomatic conference should be held in 1998, and
postponed to the next session decisions on "the necessary arrangements made
for the diplomatic conference ... to be held in 1998, unless the General Assem~
bly decides otherwise in view of relevant circumstances."47 In Resolution
52/160, December 15, 1997, the General Assembly again authorized the Prepa~
ratory Committee to continue its work early in 1998 and to transmit the text of
its final report directly to the Conference.48 It also decided to hold the Confer~
ence in Rome between June 15 and July 17, 1998, and adopted relevant ancil~
lary decisions.
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Three other major events occurred in this period of the prehistory of the es,
tablishment of the International Criminal Court. On February 22, 1993, the
Security Council adopted Resolution 808 (1993). In that resolution it decided
that an international tribunal should be established for the prosecution of per,
sons responsible for serious violations of international humanitarian law com'
mitted in the territory of the former Yugoslavia since 1991. It requested the
Secretary,General to submit for consideration by the Council, at the earliest
possible date, and if possible no later than 60 days after the adoption of the res'
olution, a report on all the aspects of this matter, including specific proposals
and where appropriate options for the effective and expeditious implementa,
tion of the decision, taking into account suggestions put forward by Member
States.
On May 3, the Secretary,General submitted his report. 49 It is a lengthy doc,
ument, and it draws on the 1953 Report on International CriminalJurisdiction
(see note 35 above) as one of the sources consulted. On May 23 the Security
Council adopted Resolution 827 (1993). In that resolution, acting under
Chapter VII of the Charter, it approved the Secretary,General's report and de,
cided to establish an international tribunal "for the sole purpose of prosecuting
persons responsible for serious violations of international humanitarian law
committed in the territory of the former Yugoslavia between 1 January 1991
and a date to be determined by the Security Council upon the restoration of
peace and to this end to adopt the Statute of the International Tribunal an,
nexed to the above,mentioned report." The Tribunal (ICTY) was formed in
November 1993 and is still in operation.
This was followed in 1994 by the adoption of Resolution 955 (1994) on No,
vember 8, 1994. Here, again acting under Chapter VII of the Charter, the Se,
curity Council adopted the Statute for the International Tribunal for Rwanda
(ICTR). The Government of Rwanda asked for this tribunal to be established
for the sole purpose of prosecuting persons responsible for genocide and other
serious violations of international humanitarian law committed in the territory
of Rwanda and Rwandan citizens responsible for genocide and other such vio,
lations committed in the territory of neighboring States between January 1,
1994 and December 31, 1994. Subject to that major difference over jurisdic,
tion, the Statute of the ICTR follows closely the Statute of the ICTY, and a sin,
gle Appeals Chamber acts for both tribunals. Unfortunately, little is known
about the activities ofICTR. Nevertheless, it is the first international tribunal
to have convicted and sentenced persons accused of the crime of genocide. 50
The third major event was the completion in 1996 by the I~ternational Law
Commission of the Draft Code of Crimes against the Peace and Security of
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Mankind.51 The General Assembly, in Resolution 51/160, December 15,1996,
drew the attention of States participating in the preparatory committee on the
establishment of the International Criminal Court to the relevance of the Code
to their work. However, although the Preparatory Committee had the draft
Code before it, it made no relevant recommendation and there is no reference
to the Code as such in the Rome Statute.52
That is the background against which the United Nations Diplomatic Con~
ference of Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of an International Criminal
Court worked.
Some Afterthoughts
This historical recital of the complicated events leading up to the Rome
Conference goes a long way in explaining the difficulties encountered by that
Conference, its unfinished business, and the defects, both of form (lack of con~
cordance in the language versions and many presumed typographical errors in
the "authentic" text) and of substance.
In the 1950s, the General Assembly, correctly, requested the International
Law Commission for its opinion on the feasibility and advisability of establish~
ing a permanent international criminal court. Equally correctly, it entrusted
the work of preparing the statute of such a court to ad hoc intersessional com~
mittees composed of the representatives of States. The work of those ad hoc
committees formed the basis for the report of the Secretary~Generalleading to
the establishment by the Security Council of the Yugoslav Tribunal, and indi~
rectly also to that of the Rwanda Tribunal. Preparing the constituent instru~
ment of an international organization is neither progressive development of the
law nor its progressive codification. It is a highly political act, requiring, of
course, both political and legal inputs. In the case of an international criminal
court, at least three branches of law are relevant-international law, criminal
law, and military law, this latter both from the aspect of the internal discipline
of the armed forces (chain of command) and from the point of view of military
criminal law as such. The application of a rule of criminal law by a court~martial
can be very different from the application of that same rule by a civil criminal
court.
In 1948 the General Assembly also correctly linked the Convention on the
Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide with the eventual estab~
lishment of an international criminal court, without prejudice to the general
international responsibility of a State in the event of breach by the State of its
obligations under that Convention, and without prejudice to the obligation
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imposed by Article V on all parties to enact appropriate legislation to give ef~
fect to the provisions of the Convention and in particular to provide effective
penalties for persons guilty of genocide.53 At the same time it placed States un~
der the obligation to enact the necessary legislation to give effect to the provi~
sions of the Convention, and in particular to provide effective penalties for
persons guilty of genocide or other offenses enumerated in the Convention
(Article V). The International Law Commission continued along those lines by
linking its proposed court to the Draft Code of Crimes. Again, in the 1980s, the
General Assembly seems to have invited the International Law Commission to
"address" the question of establishing an international criminal court, an~
swered by the Commission in its report of 1992 (note 41 above). In 1992 the
General Assembly, in a complete reversal of its earlier position, and possibly
without fully considering the implications, requested the Commission to pre~
pare the draft statute, which the Commission did in 1994 (note 45 above). It is
to be observed that the International Law Commission, hurried by the General
Assembly, did not follow its customary practice of giving its text two readings,
the second taking place after an interval of two years on the basis of the obser~
vations, written and oral, of governments on the first draft. The result was that
the Commission's final.text did not take sufficient account of the political atti~
tudes of the different governments and comment on them in its final report on
the topic. The General Assembly accordingly had to establish two
intersessional committees to study the text in light of political considerations,
and yet the final report of the Preparatory Committee (note 48 above), which
became the basic proposal for consideration by the Conference,54 contained a
large number of square brackets, footnotes and options, pinpointing the ab~
sence of agreement on major issues. It was not a true basic text as that term is
commonly understood in conference practice.55 What is more, it was com~
pleted and circulated to States only a short while before the opening of the
Conference, allowing Governments little time or opportunity to give it the full
consideration that it deserved and required, or to undertake the usual diplo~
matic consultations with other participants in the Conference. If the Rome
Statute has defects, without doubt one explanation lies in the haste with which
the Conference was convened, without adequate or completed preparatory
work.
Given this slow progress in the preparatory work and its incompleteness, it is
difficult to understand how in Resolution 52/160, December 15, 1997, the
General Assembly decided to convene a diplomatic conference of plenipoten~
tiaries a bare six months later to complete and adopt the convention, and al~
lowed only for five working weeks in all, that is thirty working days for that
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Conference to complete its work. This final rush contrasts strangely with the
slow and careful work that had been undertaken before 1992.
It also seems that the organization of the Conference itself was atypical. Rule
48 of the Rules of Procedure required the Conference to establish a Committee
of the Whole. Normal conference practice is for the committee of the whole to
examine the basic text, article by article, and to submit its conclusions to the
plenary conference. It is not clear that this was done in all cases. From some of
the statements made at the concluding session on July 17,1998, it appears that
delegations had not been given a proper opportunity to express their views on
portions of the text before it was put to the final vote in the Conference. In ad,
dition, the long list of corrigenda submitted by the Secretariat, itself incomplete
as mentioned, confirms that the arrangements for verification of the concor,
dance of the six authentic language versions of the Convention were unsatis,
factory. The extraordinarily large number of typographical corrigenda
suggested by the Secretariat shows that the Drafting Committee (Rules of Pro,
cedure, Article 49) and the Secretariat were not given sufficient time to com,
plete their work properly. This adds up to a sorry story.

*

*

*

In 1996 the International Law Commission completed the first reading of its
draft articles on the topic of State responsibility. Article 24, paragraph 5, of the
Rome Statute lays down that no provision in the Statute relating to individual
criminal responsibility shall affect the responsibility of States under interna,
tionallaw. 56 Likewise, Article 4 of the draft Code of Crimes against the Peace
and Security of Mankind also states that the fact that the Code provides for the
responsibility of individuals for crimes against the peace and security of man,
kind is without prejudice to any question of the responsibility of States under
international law. The Commentary to that article suggests that it is possible,
indeed likely, that an individual may commit a crime against the peace and se,
curity of mankind as an "agent of the State," "on behalf of the State," "in the
name of the State," or even in a de facto relationship with the State, without
being invested with legal power. The State may remain responsible and be un,
able to exonerate itself from responsibility by invoking the prosecution or pun,
ishment of the individuals who committed the crime. 57 This is pointing the way
to a complicated set of legal relationships between States, and perhaps also be,
tween courts and tribunals.
Article 19 of the draft articles on State responsibility as adopted on first reading
has a direct bearing on this. Article 19 in that form is headed "International
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crimes and international delicts." It is, however, a confused article, not differ~
entiating clearly between acts of State of particular gravity and acts of the indi~
vidual that are themselves violations of rules of international law to which an
individual is subjected, such as genocide. 58
It is interesting to note that throughout the prehistory of the Rome Statute,
in which the applicable law was a central issue, little thought appears to have
been given to the relationship of the general law of State responsibility and the
international criminal law to be applied by the International Criminal Court.
So far, the International Law Commission does not appear to have faced the
matter until 1998, when it was raised for the first time. 59 This issue was appar~ ;
ent during the drafting of the Genocide Convention, as appears from the com~
bination of Articles VI and IX of that Convention, discussed earlier. Article 19
was introduced into the draft articles on State responsibility in 1976, and there~
fore has been present throughout the greater part of the renewed discussions
on the establishment of an international criminal court. This interrelationship
is a matter to which further thought should be given, especially in connection
with the provisions in the articles on State responsibility regarding the dis~
charge of the international responsibility, and in regard to the settlement of dis~
putes. Trial and punishment of the individual responsible for the crime coming
within the jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court, and that in fact in~
cludes all the crimes listed in Article 19 as it now stands that can be committed
by an individual, may well be included as an element of satisfaction for the di~
rectly injured State. For this reason, the question arises whether the completed
codification of the law of State responsibility should not contain a parallel pro~
vision, to the effect that nothing in that codification affects any question of
criminal responsibility coming within the jurisdiction of the International
Criminal Court.

*

*

*

When the Rome Statute enters into force, the international community will
have three standing international tribunals at its disposal-the International
Court of Justice (Iq) , the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea
(ITLOS), and the International Criminal Court (ICC). There is very little
overlap between them as to jurisdiction, and the risk of the fragmentation of
the law is slight. The case law of the two ad Me criminal tribunals. ICTY and
ICTR, established by the Security Council, shows a marked tendency to seek
guidance from the jurisprudence of the International Court. The limited expe~
rience to date ofITLOS shows a similar inclination, and one must presume that
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the new International Criminal Court will act similarly if it is to gain general
confidence. However, the existence of the ICJ and ITLOS alongside the ICC is
likely to give rise to an unsuspected conflict, not of jurisdiction but of propriety,
of whether one or other of these "civil" tribunals, the ICJ and ITLOS, can de,
termine a case before it without causing detriment to the criminal tribunal.
The difference has been pithily explained by the Trial Chamber ofICTY in the
Celebici case: "The International Tribunal [ICTY] is a criminal judicial body,
established to prosecute and punish crimes for violations of international hu,
manitarian law, and not to determine State responsibility for acts of aggression
or unlawful intervention."60
The potential conflict is demonstrated by the Application of the Genocide
Convention case in the International Court of Justice between Bosnia and
Herzegovina on the one side, and Yugoslavia on the other. In that case the ap,
plicant's claims have been met by the respondent's counterclaims. 61 Both par,
ties are alleging violations of the Genocide Convention by the other. The crime
of genocide, when committed by an individual, comes within the jurisdiction of
ICTY, and in due course of that of the International Criminal Court also (but
that aspect can be ignored for present purposes). The Rwanda Tribunal has, as
mentioned, already tried two cases of individuals accused of the crime of geno,
cide (see note 50 above). The dispute between States over the interpretation,
application or fulfillment of the Genocide Convention comes within the exclu,
sive jurisdiction of the International Court ofJustice. Although it is clear that
the International Court itself is dealing with the "civil" responsibility of the
parties, in the pleadings, the allegations and the defenses rest upon the actions
of individuals. Should those individuals be called to testify in the International
Court, they may be forced either not to reply to questions or to incriminate
themselves. In that way the question arises how to reconcile the claims of
States parties to reparation for alleged violations of the Genocide Convention
as a matter of State responsibility, with the claims of the international commu,
nity for criminal trials before a competent international tribunal of those indi,
viduals accused of committing acts of genocide. The matter can be put the
other way round. How, in such circumstances, can the right of an individual,
accused of genocide, to a fair trial, required by Article 14 of the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights of December 16, 1966,62 with the possi,
bility of an acquittal, be reconciled with the right of the States parties to the liti,
gation in the International Court to have their claims decided by the principal
judicial organ of the United Nations?
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In such circumstances, the human rights law, many elements of which are
regarded as possessing the quality of jus cogens, should have priority over the
law of State responsibility.

*

*

*

It has been seen how in the intermediate stage of this history, the General
Assembly found a close connection to exist between three separate topics on
a shared agenda with the International Law Commission: the definition of
aggression, the Draft Code of Crimes, and the international criminal court.
For a certain period the General Assembly attempted to keep them in step. To
that triad there has also to be added the codification of the law of State respon~
sibility, which the International Law Commission is planning to complete by
the year 2001. Events, however, have unraveled the initial triad, which never,
until now, has considered the law of State responsibility to belong to this
complex.
Under a series of resolutions annexed to the Final Act of the Rome Confer~
ence (note 42 above), unfinished business of the Conference to be considered
in due course by the Review Conference envisaged in Article 123 of the Statute
includes an acceptable definition of terrorism and drug trafficking and their in~
clusion in the list of crimes within the Court's jurisdiction. In addition, the Pre~
paratory Commission is required to prepare draft texts for what is termed
"Elements of Crimes" addressed in Articles 9 and 21 of the Statute, this to be
done before the year 2000. It is also to prepare proposals for a provision on ag~
gression, including the definition and elements of crimes of aggression and the
conditions under which the International Criminal Court shall exercise its ju~
risdiction with regard to that crime.
This wide remit to the Preparatory Commission, far beyond what is usual
for a preparatory commission, coinciding in time with the second reading of
the draft articles on State responsibility in the International Law Commission,
and during the process of the final decision on the draft Code of Crimes, pro~
vides the opportunity to put together a complete and properly co~ordinated
set of black letter texts embracing the whole law of international responsibil~
ity, including the "civil responsibility" of States, international organizations,
and other actors on the international scene capable of sustaining a claim of
international responsibility, and the international criminal responsibility of
individuals charged with breaching the basic rules of international humani~
tarian law and other rules of international law laying down international
crimes.
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Appendix
French Translation of Letter of F. Lieber to
General G. H. Dufour, New York, April 10, 1872 (See note 8)
Monsieur,
J'ai re~u il y a quelques jours votre honoree lettre du 1 fevrier ... Je
m'empresse de vous donner mon opinion, malgre la divergence qui peut
exister entre nos vues concernant I'application des principes sur lesquels
nous sommes completement d'accord.
Je suis un des juristes qui se sont declares, de la maniere la plus claire et la
plus expresse, en faveur de l' expansion et de la multiplication constante de
I'arbitrage et de la conciliation entre nations.
J'ai meme fortement recommande de retourner a la coutume de
moyen~age, et de prendre pour arbitres internationaux les facultes de droit
des universites en renomj mais je me suis prononce deja dans mes Political
Ethics contre !'idee d'une Haute~Cour internationale, par laquelle tous les
differends entre nations seraient decides. J'ai cru que la realisation de cette
idee, quand meme elle serait possible, ne serait nisouhaitable ni efficace. Je
n'ai pas change d'opinion.
QUi serait Ie sheriff (I'executeur des decisions) d'une haute Cour des na~
tions? Et quel est meme Ie tribunal ordinaire dont les jugements feraient
quelque impression, si l'on ne savait que ses arrets seront appliques par Ie
pouvoir public? II est vrai que Hugo Grotius fut cite comme autorite au
Congres des nations Europeennes a Vienne. Mais s'il fut cite ainsi
au~dessus des monarques, des ministres et des nations, c'est precisement
parce qu'il n'etait qu'un simple particulier, absent de la lutte et ayant ecrit
son ouvrage sur la paix et la guerre, sous la dictee de la raison et de la jus~
tice, sans se preoccuper aucunement des cas en question, qui appelaient les
lumieres de la raison et de la justice.
Des nations libres seraient toujours dans une position desavantageuse
devant un pareil tribunal: car les gouvernements plus ou moins
despotiques sont toujours mieux places que les nations libres pour cabaler
et intriguer, et les nations libres ont specialement besoin d'autonomie. Ce
besoin, sans equivaloir a l'isolement, croltra avec les progres de la liberte et
Ie developpement du self~govemment. Je suis parfaitement certain que peu
des citoyens americains consentiraient a confier une affaire litigieuse dans
laquelle leur republique serait interessee, a une Haute~Cour internationale
permanente, quelque favorable qu'il puisse etre a des tribunaux d'arbitrage
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etablis par des traites speciaux. Le pouvoir de ces derniers tribunaux et
l'autorite de leurs decisions sont diis precisement a la raison qu'ils sont
constitues par consentement mutuel, et pour l'occasion speciale dont il
s'agit. Ce n'est-pas une jalousie puerile, mais Ie besoin de l'autonomie qui
empecherait une nation libre de quelqu'importance de se rallier a une
Haute-Cour internationale permanente.
T outes ces raisons s'appliquent avec beaucoup plus grande force au tribunal international que vous proposez pour juger les infractions a la convention de Geneve en cas de guerre. Vous dites, art. 6 ; les jugements du tribunal
seront notifies par lui aux gouvemements interesses et ceux ci seront tenus
d'injliger aux coupables les peines prononcees contre eux.

Tenus? Par qui les gouvernements respectifs seront-ils tenus de punir ceux
qui ant viole les regles de la Convention de Geneve, si les belligerants ne Ie
font par leur propre volonte? Les temps recents nous ont fourni deux examples de peuples,-l'un en Europe, l'autre en Amerique,-succombant
l'un et l'autre parce qu'ils etaient enerves par la vanite. Les infractions aux
principes protecteurs de la Convention de Geneve ont ete frequentes;
peut-on imaginer la soumission aux jugements du tribunal international de
la part de ceux qui frequemment ont meconnu les lois les plus elementaires
de la guerre? Et quand je parle de la Convention de Geneve ne vous
meprenez pas, je vous prie, sur mes sentiments a son egard. Rien n' est plus
sacre ames yeux que ce spectacle de la charite se mettant au pas du tambour et marchant en avant, non pour se battre, mais pour relever les blesses
or pour succomber elle-meme dans l'accomplissement de cette tache. Mais
je m'occupe seulement ici de ce qu'il y a de praticable ou de desirable dans
l'execution de votre plan.
Si la Confederation suisse doit etre a perpetuite la gardienne de ce tribunal
international, qu'arrlvera-t-il au cas ou la Suisse elle-meme serait
enveloppee dans une guerre? Elle l'a ete, pourquoi ne Ie serait-elle pas de
nouveau? II ya des moments OU les nations ne peuvent s'empecher de faire
ce que Solon exigeait de chaque citoyen en temps de discorde civile.
Vous voyez par ce que j'ai dit que, quant a moi, je ne suis pas partisan de
l'etablissement permanent de tribunaux charges de statuer entre belligerants. Cependant j'applaudis a tout ce qui, a quelque degre que ce soit,
tend a faire planner la raison, la justice et la charite, comme une nuee
bienfaisante, sur la plus ardente chaleur du combat. C'est ce que savent
taus ceux qui ont connaissance du Code des lois de la guerre sur terre, que
j'ai con~u et ecrit, et que Ie President Lincoln a publie comme ordre
general pour la conduite des armees americaines, en 1863. Je ne voudrais
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donc pas vous conseiller d'arreter brusquement tous vos efforts pour
donner une efficacite de plus en plus grande ala Convention de Geneve.
Poursuivez-Ies avec zele et ne regardez les contrarietes que comme au stimulant ades nouvelles tentatives. Car votre cause est sacree.
Comme remarque generale, je me permets de repeter a cette occasion
qu'une des choses les plus efficaces et les plus utiles que 1'on puisse faire, en
cette matiere, pour ameliorer les rapports entre nations dans la paix ou
dans la guerre (et il y a des rapports mutuels [intercourse] dans la guerre,
attendu que 1'homme ne peut se rencontrer avec l'homme sans qu'il en
resulte un echange de rappotts),-une des choses dont il y aurait Ie plus a
attendre dans 1'interet de 1'intemationalisme, serait la reunion des plus
eminents jurisconsultes du droit des gens que possede notre race
cis-caucasienne,-un de chaque pays,---en leur capacite individuelle et
non en vertu de quelque mandat public, pour regler entre eux certaines
grandes questions du droit des nations, qui sont encore indecises,-telles
que la neutralite, l' emploi de troupes barbares comme auxiliaires, la duree
des droits ou des obligations fondees sur la qualite de citoyen. J'entends
regler comme Grotius reglait ce dont il s'occupait, par Ie grand argument de
la justice. Ce qui emanerait d'un pareil corps, code ou proclamation, serait
certain d'acquerir bientot une autorite superieure au livre du plus grand
juriste isole. J'espere qu'une pareille reunion pourra avoir lieu en 1873 ou
1874.
Avec la plus haute consideration, etc.
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Notes
1. Originally issued as doc. NCONF.183/9*. That contained many errors in each one ofits
authentic texts and has been replaced by PCNICC/199/INF.3, August 17, 1999, in the
documentation of the Preparatory Commission for the International Criminal Court. Further
corrections to one or the other of the authentic texts are still being circulated by the United
Nations Secretariat, as depositary 6f the Rome Statute. For an account 6f the Rome Conference
through the eyes of participants, see Roy S. Lee (ed.), THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT:
THE MAKING OF THE ROME STATUTE, ISSUES, NEGOTIATIONS, RESULTS (1999).
2. Cf. L.C. Green, Law of War in Historical Perspective, International Law Studies Volume
72, THE LAW OF MILITARY OPERATIONS: LIBER AMICORUM PROFESSOR JACK GRUNAWALT,
pp. 39, 48 (M. Schmitt, ed., 1998); Howard S. Levie, War Crimes, ibid., p. 95. And see G.
SCH\YIARZENBERGER, INTERNATIONAL LAw (THE LAW OF ARMED CONFLICf), p. 462 (1968);
J.H.W. VERZIJL, I INTERNATIONAL LAW IN HISTORICAL PERSPECfIVE, p. 407 (1968); TH.
MERON, HENRY'S WARS AND SHAKESPEARE'S LAWS: PERSPECfNE ON THE LAW OF WAR IN
THE LATER MIDDLE AGES, pp. 12, 167 (1993).
.
3. I am grateful to Mr. Ch. Keith Hall for bringing this to my attention. And see L. Bethell,

The Mixed Commissions for the Suppression of the Transatlantic Slave Trade in the Nineteenth
Century, JOURNAL OF AFRICAN HISTORY, vol. VII (1960), p. 79. For an example of this type
of treaty and the detailed regulations for a mixed commission, see H. LA FONTAINE, PASICRISIE
INTERNATIONALE 1794-1900, HISTOIRE DocUMENTAIRE DES ARBITRAGES INTERNATIONAUX,
p. 84 (reprint, 1997, with preface by Pierre Michel Eisemann).
4. See COMPTE RENDU DE LA CONFERENCE INTERNATIONALE REUNIE A GENEVE LES, 26,
27,28 ET 29 OCfOBRE 1863 POUR ETUDIER LES MOYENS DE POURVOIR A L'INSUFFISANCE Du
SERVICESANITAIRE DANS LES ARMEES EN CAMPAGNE (deuxieme edition 1904).
5. 1 Bevans 7; 129 CONSOLIDATED TREATY SERIES (hereafter: CTS) 361; reproduced in D.
Schindler and J. Toman, THE LAws OF ARMED CONFLICfS; A COLLECfION OF
CONVENTIONS, RESOLUTIONS AND OTHER DOCUMENTS (hereafter: Schindler and Toman),
p. 279 (1988), supplemented by the Additional Articles extending the Provisions of the
Convention of August 22, 1864, to Naval Warfare, of October 20, 1868, 138 CTS 189;
Schindler and Toman, p. 285 (never in force), replaced by Hague Convention III of 1899, 187
CTS 443; Schindler and Toman 289.
6. On this see P. BOISSIER, HISTOIRE Du COMrrE INTERNATIONAL DE LA CROIX-ROUGE,
DE SOLFERINO A TSOUSHIMA, p. 395 (1978); Ch. Keith Hall, The First Proposal for a Permanent
International Criminal Court, 38 INTERNATIONAL REVIEW OF THE RED CROSS, p. 57 (1998). An
English translation of Moynier's proposal appears at p. 72. Curiously, this initiative is not
mentioned in the Historical Survey of the Question of International Criminal Jurisdiction,
Memorandum submitted [to the International Law Commission] by the Secretary-General
(hereafter: Historical Survey), doc. NCNAI7/Rev.l (Sales No. 1948.V.8) (1949).
7. Circular of January 28, 1872, reproduced in BULLETIN INTERNATIONAL DES SOCIETES
DE SECOURS AUX MILITAIRES BLESSEs PUBLIE PAR LE COMITE INTERNATIONAL DE LA CROIX
ROUGE, No. 11, p. 121 (1872). This circular was signed by General Dufour in Moynier's absence.
The ICRC took that initiative very seriously. A note in the ICRC Archives shows that, with
regard to another idea of Moynier's, the Committee approved it but decided not to insert a
reference to it in the upcoming issue of the Bulletin, for fear it would divert attention from the
proposal for the establishment of an international criminal jurisdiction. E-mail, Hans-Peter
Gasser to the author, January 11, 1999.
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8. Letter of April 10, 1872. The English original of this letter has not been found. The
French translation given in the article by Rolin-Jaecquemyns (see next note) is reproduced in
the Appendix to this article. Many of Lieber's remarks presage the position adopted by the
American delegation regarding the Rome Statute in 1998. For the American position on the
Rome Statute, see the statement of Ambassador D. Scheffer at the 9th meeting of the Sixth
Committee in the 53rd session of the General Assembly on October 21, 1998; and his The United
States and the International Criminal Court, 93 AM. J. INTL L. 12 (1999).
9. G. Rolin-Jaecquemyns, Note sur Ie projet de M. Moynier, relatif Ii l'etablissement d'une
institution judiciaire internationale, protectrice de la Conllention [de GenelleJ, 4 REVUE DE DROIT
INTERNATIONAL ET DE LEGISLATION COMPAREE, p. 325 (1872).
10.1 Bevans 631; 203 CTS 227; Schindler and Toman, p. 63.
11. JCRC, Revised and New Draft Conventions for the Protection of War Victims: Remarks
and Proposals submitted by the International Committee of the Red Cross, Article 40 (1949).
H-P. Gasser to the author, November 16, 1998. Common Article 49/50/129/148, dealing with
penal sanctions in general, obliges a party to bring persons accused of grave breaches before
its own courts or, if it prefers, and in accordance with the provisions of its own legislation, to
hand such persons over for trial to another party concerned. As far as is known, there has
been no experience of that provision in practice. At the Rome Conference, the ICRC
changed its position and strongly supported the establishment of the International Criminal
Court. See the statements of the President of the ICRC, C. Sommaruga, and of its chief Legal
Adviser, Y. Sandoz, at the commencement of the Conference. It also submitted important
comments on the jurisdiction of the Court. See docs in NCONF. 183/SR. 4, para. 68, and SR. 9,
para. 113. A check of the records of the Hague Conferences of 1899 and 1907 likewise discloses
that the idea of an international criminal jurisdiction was not raised on either occasion when
those Conferences were discussing rules for the conduct of warfare. The position of the Institute
of International Law was similar. Cf its resolution of 1895 on penal sanction for breaches of the
Geneva Convention, op. cit. in the next note at p. 69.
12. INSTITUT DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL. TABLEAU GENERAL DES REsOLUTIONS
(1873-1956), pp. 180,231 (H. Wehberg ed., 1957); Schindler and Toman, pp. 35 and 57.
13. See B. FERENCZ. I AN INTERNATIONAL CRlMINAL COURT: A STEP TOWARD WORLD
PEACE. p. 5 (1980) (hereafter: FERENCZ).
14. Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, advisory opinion, International Court
ofJustice Reports, 1996, pp. 226, 259 (para. 86). A partial explanation of the term is given in that
advisory opinion at p. 257 (para. 78). According to the Court, there are two cardinal principles in
humanitarian law: "The first is aimed at the protection of the civilian population and civilian
objects and establishes the distinction between combatants and non-combatants ... According
to the second principle, it is prohibited to cause unnecessary suffering to combatants." The term
probably originated in the International Committee of the Red Cross through the works of Jean
Pictet. See G. Abi-Saab, The Specifities of Humanitarian Law, STUDIES AND EsSAYS ON
INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARlAN LAW AND RED CROSS PRlNCIPLES IN HONOUR OF JEAN
PICTET, p. 265 (Ch. Swinarski ed., 1984). For a recent assertion of the close tie between the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the international criminal court, see the letter of
the President of the International Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, Judge Gabrielle
McDonald, to the personnel of ICIT distributed on the 50th anniversary of the Universal
Declaration, obtained from the ICIT website visited January 18,1999, <www.un.org/icty!news!
Humanrights!unidechu.htm> .
15. 225 CTS 188. And see Department of State, The Treaty of Versailles and After:
Annotations of the Text of the Treaty (Publication 2724, Conference Series 92, 1947).
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16. The treaties which put an end to the Napoleonic Wars contained no provision regarding
Napoleon's fate. Article XVI of the Treaty of Paris of May 30, 1814, provided that no individual
of whatever rank or condition should be prosecuted, disturbed, or molested, in his person or
property, under any pretext whatsoever, either on account of his conduct or political opinions,
his attachment either to any of the Contracting Parties, or to any Government which has ceased
to exist, or for any other reason except for debts contracted towards individuals, or acts posterior
to the date of the treaty. I MAjOR PEACE TREATIES OF MODERN HISTORY 1648-1967, pp. 501,
509 (FJ. Israel, ed., 1967); 63 CTS 171. With regard to Napoleon himself, on March 13, 1815,
(before the Battle of Waterloo) the Allies issued the Declaration of Vienna to the effect that he
had placed himself beyond the protection of the law. 63 CTS 495. On his later sutrender to and
custody by the British authOrities, see LoRD McNAIR, INTERNATIONAL LAW OPINIONS. vol. I,
p. 104 (1956). This was unconditional surrender of an individual, not of the State.
17. See the State Department's annotations in the publication cited in note 15 above. More
inJ.H.W. VERZIjL, op. cit. in note 2 above, vol. IX, p. 381 (1978). In addition, note Article 226 of
the Treaty of Sevres, the Treaty of Peace with Turkey, apparently intended to enable the
perpetrators of the genocide of the Armenians in World War I to be brought to trial and
punished. That treaty never entered into force. For that Treaty see 15 AM. J. INTL L.
SUPPLEMENT. p. 179 (1920).
18. Permanent Court of International Justice. Advisory Committee of Jurists.
Proces-Verbaux of the Proceedings of the Committee, June 18th-July 24th, 1920. with Annexes,
p. 748 (1920). Reproduced in I FERENCZ, pp. 193. 225, 239. Summarized in Historical Survey at
p. 10. See also M.O. HUDSON. THE PERMANENT COURT OF INTERNATIONAL JUSTICE
1920-1942, p. 85 (1943).
19. FERENCZ. pp. 244, 252; Historical Survey, pp. 12. 14. 15,61. 70, 74, 75.
20. League of Nations, Proceedings of the International Conference on the Repression of
Tetrorism, Geneva, November 1st to 16th, 1937, League of Nations doc. C.94.M,47.1938.V
(Sales No. 1938.V.3). Reproduced in I FERENCZ. p. 355 and Historical Survey, p. 88. This
Conference was prompted by the terrorist murder of King Alexander of Yugoslavia together with
the French Foreign Minister at Marseilles on September 9, 1934.
21. 3 Bevans 1140; 68 UNTS 189.
22.3 Bevans 1238; 82 UNTS 279.Twenty-four States became parties to that Agreement. On
this see Report of Robert H. Jackson. United States Representative to the International
Conference on Military Trials, London 1945 (State Department Publication 3080, 1949).
23.4 Bevans 20; Department of State. TIAS No. 1589.
24.78 UNTS 277.
25. For an authoritative account of the drafting of that provision, see N. ROBINSON, THE
GENOCIDE CONVENTION: A COMMENTARY. p. 80 (1960); and see Historical Survey, p. 30. A
similar provision was later included in Article 5 of the International Convention on the
Suppression and Punishment of the Crime of Apartheid, annexed to General Assembly
Resolution 3068 (XXVIII), November 30, 1973, 1015 UNTS 243. By Articles 5, 6 and 7.
paragraph 1 G> of the Rome Statute respectively, genocide and the crime of apartheid are within
the jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court.
26. For the sake of completeness it is recalled that in the Committee on the Question of the
Progressive Development and Codification ofInternational Law (the Committee of Seventeen),
which proposed the establishment of the International Law Commission, the French
representative, Donnedieu de Vabres (who had been the French member of the Niirnberg
Tribunal) raised the question of an international criminal court. In its report on plans for the
formulation of the principles of the Nuremberg Charter and Judgment, the Committee included
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a paragraph drawing the attention of the General Assembly to the fact that the implementation
of the principles of the Niirnberg Tribunal and its judgment, as well as the punishment of other
international crimes which may be recognized as such by international multipartite conventions
may render desirable the existence of an international judicial authority to exercise jurisdiction
over such crimes. United Nations, General Assembly, Official Records (hereafter: GAOR),
second session, Sixth Committee (doc. N33 2). And see Historical Survey, p.15. It is unusual, to
say the least, that the Final Act of the Rome Conference ignores completely this earlier action of
the General Assembly and its Committees, and that of the International Law Commission. Doc.
NCONF.183/10, July 17, 1998.
27. YEARBOOK OF THE INTERNATIONAL LAW COMMISSION. 1949, pp. 219, 238 (hereafter:
YBILC). And see its Report to the General Assembly, GAOR, fourth session, Supplement 10
(N925), paras. 32-34, ibid., p. 283. At the same time, and indeed somewhat inconsequentially,
the Commission noted that the punishment of war crimes would necessitate a clear statement of
those crimes and consequently the establishment of rules which would provide for the case
where armed force was used in a criminal manner. The majority of the Commission was opposed
to the study of the problem at that stage. "It was considered that if the Commission, at the very
beginning of its work, were to undertake this study, public opinion might interpret its action as
showing lack of confidence in the efficiency of the means at the disposal of the United Nations
for maintaining peace." Ibid., para. 18.
28. Question of International Criminal Jurisdiction, Report by Ricardo J. Alfaro, special
rapporteur (NCNA/13), YBILC, 1950-11, p. 1. Reproduced in II FERENcz, p. 241. Article 34 of
the Statute of the International Court ofJustice provides that only States may be parties in cases
before the Court.
29. Report, doc. NCNA/20, YBILC, ibid., p. 131. Reproduced in II FERENCZ. p. 259.
30. Report of the commission on the work of its second session, GAOR, fifth session,
Supplement 12 (N1316), YBILC, 1950-11, at p. 378. Reproduced in II FERENcz, p. 265. The
formal reference is to Article 34 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice. But in fact
more is required than that. Compare the qualifications required of a member of the International
Court ofJustice as set out in Articles 2 and 9 ofits Statute with those required of a member of the
International Criminal Court as set out in Article 36, paragraph 3, of the Rome Statute.
31. That resolution is reproduced in II FERENCZ. p. 312. The 17 Members of that Committee
were Australia, Brazil, China (ROC), Cuba, Denmark, Egypt, France, India, Iran, Israel, the
Netherlands, Pakistan, Peru, Syria, United Kingdom, United States of America and Uruguay.
32. Committee on International Criminal Jurisdiction, Report to the General Assembly,
GAOR, seventh session, Supplement 11 (N2136). Reproduced in II FERENcz, p. 337.
33. For the comments of governments, see doc. N2186 and Add.1, GAOR, seventh session,
Annexes, Agenda item 52. Reproduced in II FERENCZ. p. 365. For the debate in the Sixth
Committee, see GAOR, seventh session, Sixth Committee, 321st to 328th meetings.
Reproduced in II FERENCZ, p. 382. That debate is summarized in the report of the Sbi:th
Committee on that agenda item (N2275).
34. This resolution is reproduced in para. 3 of the report of the 1953 Committee. See next
note.
35. Report of the 1953 Committee on International Criminal Jurisdiction, GAOR, ninth
session, Supplement 12 (N2645) (1954). Reproduced in II FERENCZ, p. 429. This Committee
was composed of Australia, Brazil, China (ROC), Cuba, Denmark, Egypt, France, India, Iran,
Israel, the Netherlands, Pakistan, Peru, Syria, United Kingdom, United States and
Uruguay-the same States that had participated in the previous Committee.
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36. Report of the Commission on the work of its sixth session, GAOR, tenth session,
Supplement 9 (doc. N2693), YBILC, 1954-11, pp. 140, 149. Reproduced in II FERENCZ. p. 460.
37. Report of the Committee on the Definition of Aggression, GAOR 12th session,
Supplement 16 (N3574). Reproduced in B. FERENcz, I DEFINING INTERNATIONAL
AGGRESSION: THE SEARCH FOR WORLD PEACE-A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY AND
ANALYSIS, p. 215 (1975).
38. All the documentation relative to this phase is contained in B. FERENCZ, op. cit. in
previous note, from page 272. The International Court of Justice seems to have regarded that
definition as addressing the "civil" responsibility of a State. Military and Paramilitary Activities
in and against Nicaragua (Merits) case (Nicar. v. U.S., June 27, 1986), INTERNATIONAL COURT
OF JUSTICE REPORTS. 1986, pp.14, 103 (para. 195).
39. Article 112 of the Statute regulates the Assembly of States Parties. Article 123 deals with
the Review Conference, which the Secretary-General is obliged to convene seven years after the
entry into force of the Statute. By Article 126, the Statute will enter into force on the first day of
the month after the 60th day following the date of deposit of the 60th instrument of ratification,
acceptance, approval or accession with the Secretary-General of the United Nations. In
Resolution 53/105, December 8, 1998, the General Assembly authorized the Secretary-General
to convene the Preparatory Commission in 1999 and to provide it with the necessary services.
For a consolidated report on the activities of the Preparatory Commission in 1999, see doc.
PCNICC/1999/L.5/Rev.l and Adds. I, 2, December 22,1999.
40. FERENCZ. op. cit. in note 37, p. 599.
41. For that final text, see Report of the International Law Commission on the work of its
48th session, GAOR, 51st session, Supplement 10 (N51/1O), Chapter II. At the same time, the
Commission adopted on first reading its draft articles on State Responsibility. Ibid., Chapter III.
The change in the title of this item from Draft Code of Offenses to Draft Code of Crimes was
suggested by the Commission and accepted by the General Assembly in Resolution 42/151,
December 7, 1987. \Y/e shall return to that topic later in this article. See text to note 52 below.
Outside the framework of the Sixth Committee, in 1981 a working group submitted to the
Commission on Human Rights a draft convention on the establishment of an international
criminal panel for the suppression and punishment of the crime of apartheid and other
international crimes. See Study on the ways and means of ensuring the implementation of
international instruments such as the International Convention on the Suppression and
Punishment of the Crime of Apartheid including the establishment of an international
jurisdiction envisaged in the Convention. Doc. E/CN.4/1926 (1981). For the Convention of30
November 1973, see 1015 UNTS 243.
.
42. Report of the International Law Commission on the work of its 42nd session, GAOR,
45th session, Supplement 10 (N45/1O), YBILC, 1992-11/2, Chapter II, paras. 93-157. This was
prepared by a \Y/orking Group composed of Doudou Thiam as chairman (he was special
rapporteur for the topic of the Draft Code), H. AI-Bahama, J.A. Beesley, M. Benouna, L.D.
Gonzalez, B. Graefrath, J. Illueca, A.G. Koroma, S. Pawlak, P.S. Rao and E. Racounas, with G.
Eiriksson, Rapporteur of the Commission, ex officio. See also Topical summary of the discussion
held in the SLxth Committee of the General Assembly during its 45th session, prepared by the
Secretariat (NCN.4IL456, mimeographed, 1991); D. Thiam, Tenth Report on the Draft Code
of Crimes against the Peace and Security of Mankind, YBILC, 1992-11/1 (NCN.4/442). Given
this historical background, it is ironic that the Rome Statute does not include drug trafficking
amongst the crimes over which the new International Criminal Court at present has jurisdiction.
The Rome Conference annexed to the Final Act Resolution E which, inter alia, recognized that
international trafficking of illicit drugs is a very serious crime, sometimes destabilizing the
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political and social and economic order in States. The Conference regretted that no generally
acceptable definition of drug crimes could be agreed upon for inclusion within the jurisdiction of
the Court and recommended that a Review Conference (see note 39 above) consider drug
crimes with a view to arriving at an acceptable definition and its inclusion in the list of crimes
within the jurisdiction of the Court. This may well put the question off ad calendas Graecas. For
that Final Act, see note 26 above.
43. See Official Records of the Diplomatic Conference on the Reaffirmation and
Development of International Humanitarian Law Applicable in Armed Conflicts, Geneva,
1974-1977, 17 volumes (1978). The major commentaries on those instruments are:
INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE OF THE RED CROSS, COMMENTARY ON THE ADDITIONAL
PROTOCOLS OF 8 JUNE 1977 TO THE GENEVA CONVENTIONS OF AUGUST 12, 1949 (Y. Sandoz
et al. eds., 1987); M. BOTHE ET AL., NEW RULES FOR VICTIMS OF ARMED CONFLICTS (1982).
For the text of Protocol I, see 1125 UNTS 3, and for that of Protocol II, see ibid., p. 609. They are
reproduced in Schindler and Toman, pp. 621, 689. In 1999 the International Committee of the
Red Cross submitted to the Preparatory Commission of the International Criminal Court a
detailed analysis of the war crimes as set out in Article 8 of the Rome Statute. This consists of an
exhaustive research of the relevant case law, a review of cases from the Leipzig Trials, from
post-Second World \Xfar trials, as well as national case law and decisions from the ICIY and ICTR.
See docs. PCNICC/1999/WGEC/INF.1, February 19, 1999, PCNICC/1999/WGEC/INF.2 plus
Adds 1-4, July 14, July 30, August 4, November 24 and December 15, 1999. This analysis was
submitted under covering letter from Belgium, Finland, Hungary, the Republic of Korea, and the
Permanent Observer Mission of Switzerland.
44. Report of the International Law Commission on the work ofits 44th session, GAOR, 47th
session, Supplement 10 (N48/1O), YBIlC, 1993-II/2, Annex. For the written comments of
governments, see YBIlC, 1993-II/1 (NCN.4/452 and Add.1). See also Topical summary of the
discussion held in the Sixth Committee of the General Assembly during its 47th session,
prepared by the Secretariat (NCNAI446, mimeographed, 1993), paras. 17-134.
45. Report of the International Law Commission on the work ofits 46th session, GAOR, 49th
session, Supplement 10 (N49!1O) , Chapter II, paras. 30-91, YBIlC, 1994-II/2, p. 19. The
Working Group was composed of}. Crawford (Chairman), H. AI-Baharna, A. AI-Khasawneh,
G. Arangio-Ruiz, M. Bennouna, D. Bowett, C. Rodriguez, J. de Saram, G. Eiriksson, S. Fomba,
M. Guney, Q. He, K. Idris, P.S. Rao, E. Razafindralambo, P.L. Robinson, R. Rosenstock, Ch.
Tomuschat, V. Vereschchetin, F.V. Kramer, and A. Yankov. In addition, Doudou Thiam as
special rapporteur on the Draft Code and P. Kabatsi as rapporteur of the Commission took part
in the work of the Group, which was open to every member of the Commission who wished to
participate. And see Topical Summary of the discussion held in the Sixth Committee of the
General Assembly during its 48th session, prepared by the Secretariat (NCNAI457,
mimeographed, 1994) , paras. 8-206; Topical Summary of the discussion held in the Sixth
Committee of the General Assembly during its 49th session, prepared by the Secretariat
(NCNAI464/Add.1, mimeographed, 1995), paras. 1-188. And see the statement of Professor
Crawford at the Conference, representing the International Law Commission, in
NCONF.183/SR.2, para. 102.
46. Report of the Ad hoc Committee on the Establishment of an International Criminal
Court, GAOR, 50th session, Supplement 22 (N50/22) (1995). The Chairman of this
Committee was Adriaan Bos (the Netherlands).
47. Report of the Preparatory Committee on the Establishment of an International Criminal
Court, vols. I and II, GAOR, 51st session, Supplements 22 and 22A (N51122) (1996). The
Chairman of this Committee was Adriaan Bos. Sickness prevented him from being Chairman of
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the Committee of the Whole at the Rome Conference, where his place was taken by Philippe
Kirsch (Canada).
48. For the Preparatory Committee's final report, see doc. NCONF.183/2 and Add. 1 (1998),
the latter constituting the basic proposal before the Conference. Available on the UN Internet site
http://www.un.orglicc. For accounts of its progress, see C. Hall, On the Successive Sessions of the
Committee, in AM.J. INT'L L, vol. 91 (1997), p.l77, vol. 92 (1998), pp. 124,391,548.
49. S/25704. Reproduced in INTERNATIONAL TRIBUNAL FOR THE PROSECUTION OF
PERSONS REsPONSIBLE FOR SERIOUS VIOLATIONS OF INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW
COMMITTED IN THE TERRITORY OF THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA SINCE 1991 (hereafter: ICTY),
BASIC DOCUMENTS. p.155 (1995). See also on Internet site http://www.un.org/icty. For the
Statute of ICTY and other relevant constituent documents, see that publication and Internet
site. The question of the legality of the Security Council's action in establishing that tribunal was
raised by the defence in the Tadic case, and upheld in the Appeals Chamber. 105
INTERNATIONAL LAW REpORTS, p. 427 (Trial Chamber, 1995), p. 453 (Appeals Chamber).
50. Prosecutor v. Akayesu. Judgment of September 2, 1998 (http://www.un. org/ictrl
english/judgments/akayesu.html, visited September 15. 1998) (the accused pleaded not guilty);
Prosecutor v. Kambanda, judgment of September 4, 1998, (http://www.un.org.ictr/english/
judgmentslkambanda.html, visited September 15, 1998) (the accused pleaded guilty). Relevant
materials are available on Internet site http://www.ictr.org or http://www.un.org/ictr. Those
judgements are excerpted in 37 ILM 1399 and 1411 (1998).
51. See note 41 above.
52. In the discussion in the International Law Commission on the law to be applied in the
proposed court. some members considered that the problem could be resolved by completing the
draft Code of Crimes. The other view was that the Court should apply existing law, but that the
Statute should be drafted in such a way as not to foreclose the future application of the Code.
Report for 1994, note 45 above, para. 56. To some extent Article 10 of the Rome Statute, to the
effect that nothing in Part 2 should be interpreted as limiting or prejudicing existing or
developing rules of international law for purposes other than the Statute, may reflect that point
of view. When the International Law Commission adopted the Draft Code of Crimes, one ofits
recommendations was that the Code could be incorporated in the Statute of the International
Criminal Court. The General Assembly took no direct action on that recommendation. See the
Commission's Report for 1996 (note 41 above). The Report of the Ad hoc Committee (note 46
above) at para. 57 indicates reservations at using the Draft Code as a basis for defining the
crimes, and the Report of the Preparatory Committee (note 47 above) confirms that there was
little support for using the Draft Code. the general preference being to define each crime
separately, as is done in Articles 6 to 8 of the Statute. In Prosecutor v. Furundzija, the Trial
Chamber of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (lCTY) considered
the Draft Code as an authoritative international instrument which, depending on the specific
question at issue, may (i) constitute evidence of customary law, or (ii) shed light on customary
rules which are of uncertain content or are in process of formation, or, at the very least, (iii) be
indicative oflegal views of eminently qualified publicists representing the major legal systems of
the world. Judgement of December 10, 1998, para. 227. The Trial Chamber also made use of the
Commission's commentary. on the Draft Code. Later the Trial Chamber used the Draft Code in
examining the accused's mens rea (para. 242). Case No. IT-95-17/1-T 10, Judgement of
December la, 1998 excerpted in 38 ILM 317 (1999). In using the work of the International Law
Commission in this way the Trial Chamber has followed the usage of the International Court of
Justice in the Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Project case (Hung./Slovak.), INTERNATIONAL COURT OF
JUSTICE REpORTS 1997, 7.54 (para. 79).
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53. Article IX of the Convention provides that disputes between the contracting parties
relating to the interpretation, application or fulfilment of the Convention, including those
relating to the responsibility of a State for genocide or any of the other acts enumerated in Article
III (see text to note 25 above), shall be submitted to the International Court of Justice at the
request of any of the parties to the dispute. Interpreting that provision in the Application of the
Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (preliminary
objections) case, the International Court said that the reference in Article IX to the
responsibility of a State for genocide or for the other acts enumerated in Article III does not
exclude any form of State responsibility. INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE REPORTS, 1996,
pp. 595, 616 (para. 32). The drafting history of that provision, and indeed its own terms,
indicates that this refers to what is sometimes loosely called "civil responsibility" as opposed to
criminal responsibility. For my account and interpretation of the drafting history of that
provision, see Sh. Rosenne, War Crimes and State Responsibility, in WAR CRIMES IN
INTERNATIONAL LAW pp. 65, 74 (Tel Aviv University, Y. Dinstein and M. Tabory eds., 1996).
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